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The Problem of Integrability in Utility Theory'
By PAUL A. SAMUELSON
I. HISTORICAL SURVEY OF THE INTEGRABILITY ISSUE
A chapter in the history of utility theory has now been brought to a close by Mr. Houthakker's2 important discussion of integrability. As far back as i886, G. B. Antonelli3 had noted that such a problem existed and seems to have given the correct " integrability conditions ". But to most economists this problem was first introduced by Irving Fisher's4 I892 study-perhaps the best of all doctoral dissertations in economics. Even here it is introduced pretty much as an afterthought so that it is no great wonder that Pareto's Manuale di economica politica5 (I906) should have neglected this topic-even though Pareto was clearly aware of Fisher's work and had discussed integrability in journal articles as far back as I893.
Vito Volterra6 in his I906 review of the Manuale performed one of the few services professional mathematicians have ever rendered to economic. theory: he pointed out that when Pareto treats the case of three or more goods, his discussion of indifference directions is marred by the failure to recognise explicitly the integrability problem. Pareto admitted his mistake and discussed the problem a few This was a necessary preliminary for the later articles of Hicks-Allen and for their separate later writings. Allen was unacquainted with Slutsky's work but refers to most of the other important early writers. He entertains the hypothesis of non-integrability; and if I dare impute any differences to the separate components of the Hicks-Allen composite commodity, I would say that Hicks consistently rules out the non-integrability case, while Allen accepts it as the more general hypothesis. At least Allen in his I932, I934 , and I937 treatments deals at length with non-integrability, while Hicks in his I934, I937, and I939 treatments goes out of his way to make it clear that he is against nonintegrability.' Hicks-Allen also noted an empirical implication of integrability that is the inverse of the Slutsky reciprocity relation: under integrability, when tea is a substitute for coffee vis-a'-vis a third commodity, then according to their same I934 definition, coffee must be numerically equal as a substitute for tea.
As a partial digression, I should mention the I932 work of Hotelling on the related problem of profit-maximisation by a firm not subject to a budgetary constraint.2 Integrability conditions arise there which are related to, but distinct from, those that arise in the case of a consumer under budgetary constraint.3 In this connection, the reader can be referred to Henry Schultz' I937 book which gives an extensive discussion of the integrability question while not itself an entirely satisfactory resolution of the problem, Schultz' pages give a very good summary of the uncertainties that pervade the literature. 4 Professor Nicholas Georgescu-Roegen, now of Vanderbilt University, wrote in I936 one of the most important 1 J. R. Hicks: Economica, Vol. I4 (1934) 8 However, if we are willing to make very special assumptions of a good with constant marginal cardinal utility, we can write U(X1, . .. I, xI)= x1+ V(x2, .... , x) for proper choice of units. This is to be a maximum subject to the budget constraint i * x1+p2x2+. * PnXn=I; and thus, with income effects emasculated, the consumer can be thought of as maximising wi:hout constraint clarifications of the problem of integrability and also of the even more subtle problems of transitivity.' Until re-reading his article recently, I did not realise how much it must have stimulated my own work on the subject, -as embodied in two I938 articles and later.2
In 1943, Dr. Herman Wold of Uppsala University, Sweden, wrote three illuminating articles on demand analysis entitled "A Synthesis of Pure Demand Analysis 9.3 Since these appeared in a rather specialised journal and during wartime, it is to be feared that they may suffer the neglect that was long the fate of Slutsky's fundamental paper. I know in my own case, although I was honoured with reprints, they arrived at a time when I was temporarily out of economics; I am ashamed to say that I have only recently read them after some correspondence with Mr. Houthakker; and I am even more ashamed of failure to cite these important papers in my Foundations of Economic Analysis (I947). 4 Although the above list of references cannot pretend to be exhaustive,5 it does bring us down to the present time and to Mr. Houthakker's important contribution.
THE MEANING OF INTEGRABILITY: TWO-DIMENSIONAL CASE
I do not think there is any simple way of picturing integrability conditions so that we can easily grasp their meaning in common-sense intuitive terms. This is because the picture must be in three-dimensional space at least, and because it must concern itself with subtle "local" conditions that slopes must obey. But I shall make the attempt to convey a notion of what is involved. After this is done, we shall be in a better position to appraise the main arguments in favour of and against non-integrability. which alone is our concern. But to be myopic means to be short-sighted-not zero-sighted or infinitesimal-sighted. We shall see in our multi-variable discussion that finite sight, however local, implies integrability; but the two-variable case drives home the irrelevancy of the problem of shortsightedness for the problem of integrability-since even if we choose to assume literally infinitesimal-sightedness, we still end up with a one-parameter family of contours and no integrability problem is possible.
Secondly, there is the related confusion between the "order of consumption " followed by a consumer and the "dependence of certain line integrals on the path " between two points. It must be emphasised that the paths along which I as an economic scientist choose to evaluate the man's preference have absolutely nothing to do with the order in which the human guinea-pig consumes the goods. I don't know whether he drinks his beer before his whisky or his whisky before his beer; I don't know whether it even makes sense to say that he enjoys his shelter before rather than after he enjoys his food. Note too that in going from A to B the guinea-pig does not eat his way along the path, and in going from B to A regurgitate along the same path. Rather we should always regard the budget of goods at A as a steady flow of consumption per unit time, optimally patterned to the consumer's tastes. And the flow of consumption goods at B is again a steady flow long maintained. The comparison of A and B (and of intermediate points) is a case of comparative statics. We need not invade the privacy of the consumer's castle to concern ourselves with the minutie of his domestic arrangements.
I stress all these complications because they are complete irrelevancies. And yet they arise in the two-variable case where there is absolutely no integrability problem ! It should be absolutely clear, therefore, that the problem of " the order of consumption ", in the sense of the path along which the consumer actually moves behind the scenes of the market-place, has nothing to do with the problem of integrability versus non-integrability.
Pareto only confused the issue in his discussion of " open and closed cycles of consumption ". Actually, Pareto seems to end up with the conclusion that the consumer can be thought of as following optimal paths behind the scenes. From this he infers, if I understand his puzzling treatment, that there is no longer any ambiguity of path and therefore integrability is assured. This is all hopelessly confused: even if the consumer has definite and optimal domestichousekeeping habits, we shall still have to add strong restrictions on his revealed-preference behaviour once we have more than two goods. To repeat, Pareto's primary confusion results from his identifying the paths of integration chosen by the economist-observer for statical comparisons with the behind-the-scenes programming of pleasures by the consumer. 
CASE
When we bring a third good x3 into the picture, we must use the altitude above the floor as the direction along which we measure the third good. Now we have three axes which meet in the south-west corner of our room. Along the lower edges of the wall, x. and x2 are paced off as before. But the x3 axis is measured along the vertical of the corner. Figure za shows the three axes. Any point in the room represents a combination of all three goods, as shown by A.
If we assume that the consumer has a consistent ordinal preference field, then we shall now have indifference surfaces, rather than indifference curves. How do these surfaces look ? Rather like thin bowls inside of bowls, with the bottoms of the bowls pointing downward and south-westward toward the corner origin. As long as he moves on one bowl, the consumer is indifferent. As he moves toward " outside" bowls, nearer and nearer to the origin of zero consumption, he is worse off. As he moves away from the origin toward inner bowls, he is better off. Of course, this is all an imperfect picture: bowls are too thick, and umbrellas might be better.
Of course, any movement on an indifference surface will involve giving up something of one or more goods and taking on something of the other goods. Any movement off the surface and toward the origin involves a loss of ordinal satisfaction. Any movement off the surface in the opposite direction will involve a preferred move. If the consumer were free as a bird, he would want to get as far from the corner origin as possible, going upward and outward beyond the confines of the room and in the direction of bliss. But if we give him a limited money income, I, and prices of all goods, pl, P2, p., then he is not free as a bird. He cannot even move freely within the room. Instead he must stay inside the budget plane defined by plXl + p2X2 + p3X3 = I. Figure 2c shows the limiting budget plane beyond which the consumer cannot go. If every good is desired by the consumer, he will never stay inside the budget plane but will instead choose to crawl on its surface seeking his most preferred position. If A is such an optimum position, at that point the budget plane will be touching but not crossing the highest attainable indifference surface; hence there will be tangency, with the "bottom " of the indifference bowl just resting against the plane in the same way that a tea-cup rests against its saucer.
Of course, if income or prices change, then the budget planes will change and a new optimum point of tangency will be found': thus we define the general demand functions showing how each good will depend on all prices and income.
Thus far I have sidestepped the problem of non-integrability by assuming it away. I have implicitly assumed that the consumer does have a consistent ordinal preference field: that he can always tell of any two situations either that A is " better than " B, or B better than A, or that they are indifferent; and that his preferences among three or more situations are transitive in the sense that " if A is better than B and B better than C, then A is better than C ", etc. In short, I have assumed that indifference surfaces do exist. But need they ?
THE THREE-DIMENSIONAL CASE: NON-INTEGRABILITY
What is it that as scientists we are able actually to observe of a consumer who is in market equilibrium ? Only his demand functions in response to all possible prices and incomes. Or, in geometrical terms, all that we can observe are points like A which lie on an observable budget plane and which represent an optimum as compared to other points on or inside that plane. The reader will be tempted at this point to ask : " Just as we traced out indifference curves in the two-dimensional case as the envelope of carefully changed budget lines, can we not hope in the three-variable case to trace out the bowl-like indifference surfaces as the envelope of carefully changed budget planes ? " The answer must be worded cautiously: " Provided that the indifference surfaces exist, yes we can hope to trace them out in this way. But in the three-variable case there may not exist anything corresponding to such surfaces-unless certain extra restrictions are placed on the consumer's demand behaviour."
To investigate further the conditions of integrability and non-integrability, let us paint in just what it is that we can observe in our geometrical room. At any point such as A, we have the budget plane going through A; our stage will get too cluttered up if we leave everything on it, so for simplicity we need at A indicate only a little " piece " of its budget plane. We need only indicate at A a little button, or better still a little thumb-tack, whose back or head lies in the budget plane and whose point tells us which is the " preferred" direction. At every observable point in our room there will be a little thumb-tack suspended in space; its exact orientation in space is indicated by its point, or equally well by the head, which lies perpendicular to the point. Of course, the thumb-tack is just a nonrigorous way of picturing a little " planar element " determined at each point by the two price ratios at which equilibrium takes place: if we let x3 be our numeraire or good whose price is taken as unity, then p/lp3 and P2/P3 will be assumed to be single-valued continuously differentiable functions' of x,, X2, x3, written as pllP3 BI(x,, X2, x3) and P2/P3= B2(xl, x2, X3).
Our little planar elements or thumb-tacks are often referred to as " marginal rates of substitution" between the goods in question, or as " little indifference elements ". It is said that so long as we take a " little" step on the surface of the thumb-tack, the consumer is just" indifferent "; if we step off the thumb-tack toward its point, the consumer is moving in a " preferred " direction; finally, a move off the tack in the opposite direction is toward a " lesspreferred " direction. In the present delicate investigation I must regard this as rather dangerous terminology. We have no right to regard our little elements as anything but shorthand ways of representing the observable priceratios that give orientation to the observable budget plane passing through the observable optimum point. As behaviourists we have not yet earned the right to speak of " indifference " and "preference "; and we certainly have no right to speak of "indifference directions for infinitesimal or small movements ", especially since the underlined words are by no means unambiguous or mutually equivalent.
But no one can stop us from asking a purely mathematical question "Can we 'join together ' the little thumb-tacks to form bowl-like surfaces ? " This involves the purely mathematical properties of the partial differential equations -ax, = Bl(Xl, X2a XS) a-3= B2(Xl, X2a Q3 and of the so-called " total differential expression B'(x1, x2, x3)dxl + B2(X1, x2, x3)dx2 + i dx3.
Can we define unique bowl-like surfaces by setting the last expression equal to zero ? The mathematicians know the answer to this,2 but the meaning of their integrability conditions will not be understood until we investigate the geometrical picture further.
Few people can visualise well in three dimensions. And fewer still can correctly see what must be true about things infinitesimally close to each other. Therefore, few will be able to visualise the answer to the question of whether the thumb-tacks can be joined together to form surfaces. Let us therefore try to bring the matter down to two dimensions by the following device. Let us see what the planar elements or thumb-tacks look like on any two-dimensional surface. Let us put a thin wafer of wax in our room, bent so as to represent any desired surface. Now put in our whole field of thumb-tacks. Some tacks will not touch the wax surface; but some will have to be pushed sideward into the wax so as to lie in their specified positions. Hence, our surface will be covered by the "tracks" of the planar elements. These tracks on the wax surface will look like the little line segments of the earlier two-dimensional picture. This is because the wax surface itself has only two rather than three dimensions. Figure 3a , for example, shows how the little price ratios look on a plane which represents x1 held constant, but with x2 and x3 varying. The little slope elements can obviously from our earlier two-dimension discussion always be joined together by the reader's eye to form a family of contours (which at this stage it would be dangerous to call indifference curves). In our remaining figures we shall assume that all such two-dimensional slope elements have been integrated into smooth contours. contour, we must take away something of x3. Therefore, we move Gustav along the dark contour from A to B. Now we hold x2 constant and decrease xl; to keep Gustav indifferent we must then compensate him by increasing X3, moving him along the dark contour BC. Likewise, by increasing x1, decreasing x2 and increasing x3, we move him along the back wall, along the contour through C all the way to A'.
Gustav is obviously a rather strange chap. We have never crossed an " indifference" contour and yet we end up at the same amounts of xl and x2 as at the beginning, but with x3 necessarily greater by the amount AA'! A man with such woolly preferences can be easily cheated. If Gustav would agree to our moving him anywhere along his " indifference " contours, we could take away x3 from him by walking him around A'CBA, and we can continue the spiral downward until we have deprived him of indefinitely much x3.1
This could not happen to a Jeremy. For him, A' and A will exactly coincide: such is the meaning of the integrability condition that his demand function must obey.2 But once again I must remind the reader that the paths followed, leading to open or closed cycles, have nothing to do with the process by which a consumer moves toward equilibrium or with the order of his personal consumption agenda.
REVEALED PREFERENCE AND INTEGRABILITY
We are now in a position to complete the programme begun a dozen years ago of arriving at the full empirical implications for demand behaviour of the most general ordinal utility analysis. My own work in this direction grew out of a remark made to me by Professor Haberler in his I936 international trade seminar at Harvard. " How do you know indifference curves are concave ? " My quick retort was " Well, if they're not, your whole theory of index numbers is worthless ". Later I got to thinking about the implications of this answer (disregarding the fact that it is not worded quite accurately). Being then full of Professor Leontief's analysis of indifference curves, I suddenly realised that we could dispense with almost all notions of utility: starting from a few logical axioms of demand consistency, I could derive the whole of the valid utility analysis as corollaries.
My fundamental axiom I borrowed from modern indexnumber theory. I shall call it (for reasons that will be obvious) the Weak Axiom of Consumer's Behaviour:
Weak axiom: If at the price and income of situation A you could have bought the goods actually bought at a different point B and if you actually chose not to, then A is defined to be " revealed to be better than " B. The basic postulate is that B is never to reveal itself to be also "better than" A.
I soon realised that this could carry us almost all the way along the path of providing new foundations for utility theory. ' But not quite all the way. The problem of integrability, it soon became obvious, could not yield to this weak axiom alone.
I held up publication on the conjecture that if the axiom were strengthened to exclude non-contradictions of revealed preference for a chain of three or more situations, then non-integrability could indeed be excluded. At scientific meetings and in correspondence this problem was proposed, both to economists and mathematicians. But no proof was forthcoming for all these years, until Mr. Houthakker's paper arrived in the daily mail. Not only had he provided the missing proof, but in addition he had independently arrived at precisely the same strong axiom as I had hoped would save the day. To his paper which is such a model of logical elegance and compactness, the present historical treatment of the subject can hope to serve only as a supplement.
In words, the strong axiom can be worded roughly as follows:
Strong axiom: If A reveals itself to be " better than " B, and if B reveals itself to be " better than" C, and if C reveals itself to be " better than " D, etc..... then I extend the definition of "revealed preference" and say that A can be defined to be " revealed to be better than" Z, the last in the chain. In such cases it is postulated that Z must never also be revealed to be better than A.' What Mr. Houthakker has shown is the following: Any Gustav, whose demand functions correspond to a nonintegrable preference field, can be made to contradict the strong axiom. By judiciously varying prices and income, we can make him (on our strengthened definition of revealed preference) assert that A is better than Z and Z is at the same time better than A. Houthakker has shown how we should pick prices and income so as to reveal this contradiction. He has given us the long-sought test for integrability that can be formed in finite index-number terms, without need to estimate partial derivatives. Figure 4 .shows the same thing, but not so elegantly in that quantities and not prices are the independent variables. As Houthakker, Little and I have shown, we can pick a sequence of points very near to the path ABCA' but lying just inferior to it, along which the individual is asserting himself to be getting worse off. We finally end up just below A', but definitely above A-and it is obvious at this point that our consumer has revealed himself to have become " better off " since A' and anything near it costs more than A. Here, we have a contradiction: the point between A and A' is revealed to be both better and worse than A as a result of assuming non-integrability.
Therefore, every cycle must be closed, and integrability is assured by our strong axiom. This is a variant of Houthakker's proof.
A second variant uses the spirals shown in Figure 3c . Just as there passed an optimal budget plane through A, so too there will pass an optimal budget plane through the point B. This will show up on the original budget plane of A as a line, tangent to B. Any point, like C which lies beyond this line on the side opposite to A, will lie inside the new budget plane and will reveal itself to cost less than B and thus be inferior to B. But we can find a sequence of points (such as C, D, E, . . . etc.) which hug near to the spiral 1 I have glossed over a few delicate points. Thus, not all of the situations have to be different ones. Also, there is the question of how to handle two situations which at A's prices cost the same, but where A was chosen. If we rule out the possibility that B is "indifferent to A ", then we rule out some realistic cases of multiple equilibrium points. Even when B costs less than A at A's prices, in ruling that A is " better than B " we are making some implicit assumptions about the absence of " saturation-effects ". Throughout this paper I have dodged delicate problems of this sort, taking refuge in overly-strong assumptions about regularity of curvature. Since all this needs a definitive treatment, I must apologise for glossing over the difficulties. through C but which march clockwise all the way around to just to the right of A and which always reveal themselves to be " worse than " C. But it is also clear that all points near to A can reveal themselves to be " better than " B. Thus, we have a point near A revealed to be both better and worse than C. This is our desired contradiction, and again we end up with the inadmissibility of non-integrability.
For purposes of identification, let us call a man a Paul if he satisfies the weak axiom for single-pair comparisons, whether or not he satisfies the strong axiom for any chain. Without going into next section's arguments concerning the merits of integrability v. non-integrability, this much seems clear to me: if a man is not a Jeremy with an integrable preference field, that is understandable; but why should anyone be a semi-irrational Paul without going all the way and being a Gustav ? Or alternatively, why should an irrational Gustav make a bow in the direction of being consistent and stop short at being a Paul, refusing to take the final step toward becoming a Jeremy ? In short, I should expect there to be few Pauls reported by experienced observers.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS FOR NON-INTEGRABILITY
Let us now use the above analysis to appraise briefly the main arguments that have been advanced for nonintegrability. to equilibrium may alter the final equilibrium point reached, because of irreversible hysteresis effects ; but again, this has nothing to do with the integrability problem.
(2)
The second main argument for non-integrability involves the question of whether an individual may be able to form preferences in connection with so-called " small changes " even though he is incapable of making consistent choice judgments about far-away situations. There is indeed an air of realism about this observation, but as far as integrability is concerned this is also a complete red herring based upon logical confusion-at least such is my personal judgment after a careful re-reading of all the relevant literature. It is true that one cannot accurately predict how he would spend his income quantitatively if he became fabulously wealthy or extremely poor; but the same would no doubt still be true if he consumed only two goods, and here the problem of integrability cannot arise. ' The most devastating weakness in this view is its failure to mean by small what the mathematician should mean by small in this context-namely, finite movements not greater than some specifiable amounts. The instant the movements become finite, however small, the integrability conditions (which are themselves of a " local character ") must become applicable or we cannot speak of local preferences at all. If we try to get out of this dilemma by interpreting small to mean infinitesimally small in a rigorously defined sense, then the argument loses all its flavour of empirical realism.
I conclude this second issue by adding two red herrings of my own: (a) Georgescu-Roegen, Weber-Fechner, and others tell us that there is a " threshold effect " of perception which surrounds every situation in much the same way that static friction follows a particle on a rough table;  as Wicksell and others (c) There is the argument used ever since the time of Fisher, that non-integrability is the more general case of which integrable utility is but a special case. Since I have myself in the past stressed this point, I should like to make clear the sense in which I now think it valid. Generality pursued too avidly leads to emptiness. As scientists we must be willing to live dangerously. What we must seek is no inadmissible specialisations and no unnecessary generality. Newton did well to speak of the " inversesquare law of gravitation " rather than the " nt^-power law " ; at the same time, modern physicists do well to modify his law in the field of high-speed particles in favour of the more general Einstein relativity transformations.
As I now look at the matter, why should a Gustav, who has no mind to make up, so to speak, be expected not to be changing However, Robertson can be interpreted to mean that the quest by Pareto and later writers for non-integrable utility was both factually unnecessary and destructive to much in welfare economics. Such a viewpoint on this more specialised and technical matter has its merits, and the present paper has the humble purpose of clarifying some of the issues.
We have now completed our main task. We know what it is that integrability implies, and what non-integrability implies: we know the full empirical implications on the demand functions of being a Jeremy or a Gustav. Deductive analysis can carry us no farther. Observation of reality must be the decisive test as to which hypothesis is the more fruitful-or whether neither is very fruitful.
MATHEMATICAL NOTES ON INTEGRABILITY i.
The observable n demand functions are assumed to be single-valued and continuously differentiable in terms of prices and income, of the form x-= Dk(pl, P2, . . . ) pn I). Changing all prices and income in the same proportion will, by hypothesis, cause no change in real quantities; in consequence of this assumption of homogeneity of order zero, Euler's theorem tells us that the matrix [Dkj + DJDk1] has a zero determinant-it being understood that subscripts stand for differentiation so that Dkcj aXk/lapj, etc.
I now make the special additional hypothesis that these demand functions are reversible and can be inverted to express relative prices in terms of quantities. This will be assured in any local region around a point where the determinant of [Dkj] It is sufficient for reversibility in some small region around an observed point that the determinants of any one of these matrix products be non-zero. If we wish the B's to be reversible even when we hold some subset of x's constant, then the principal minors derived by striking out some of the first (1n -i) rows and columns must also be non-zero. The non-vanishing of all these principal minors throughout an extended domain will assure reversibility of our functions -not just locally-but throughout that domain. Slutsky also showed that the elements of S are observable empirical invariant quantities, not dependent on the form of the arbitrary numerical indexes of utility. He interpreted the elements of S as compensated changes, for which ordinal utility is constant because the change in price is just offset by a change in money income. Slutsky showed that the diagonal or " own-elasticity " elements of S must be negative; the off-diagonal elements provide the Slutsky-SchultzHicks definition of complementarity, which is of greatest qualitative richness only in the n> 2 case. It may be added that -S is positive semi-definite, being of rank n -I, and with its principal minors being all positive. S constitutes the most important part of consumption theory.
Not only are the Slutsky integrability conditions necessary, they can be shown as well to be sufficient to insure integrability. By somewhat tedious manipulation, we can show that An expression like ZQk dx,, may be satisfactory as a local measure of preference, being positive when a " better" move is being made, being zero when there is " indifference and negative when a " worse " move is being made. But its integral along any finite path between two points will generally not provide a consistent numerical indicator of ordinal preference-even if such a consistent preference field exists, and certainly not if such a field does not exist.
Only if ZQ-dx,, dQ, an exact differential with Qk = aQ/lxk = Q,, and Q,,j = Qj,, will such an integral be always the same for different paths between two specified end-points; and only in this case can we be sure that if we go from point A to point B by one path and return back to A by another path, the value of the integral will none the less be zero over the round trip, indicating that A is exactly as good as itself and not better. The above condition on the cross-derivatives will rarely be met; but we can ask whether there is not some other set of functions proportional to the B's for which we do get an exact differential. For this to exist, we must be able to find a so-called integrating factor i(x,x2, . . ., x,,) When we examine these conditions, they are seen not to be all independent. Also they are not conditions on the-Q's alone but involve i and its partial derivatives, where i is a function not even known to exist. For any triplet of variables, say j, k, r, we can eliminate i and its derivatives by algebraic manipulation, to get the following relations on the Q's alone jt k$ rtj. When n 2, there are no integrability conditions; when n=-3, there is I; when n= 4, we can write down 4 such conditions; and, in general, n(n -I)(n -2)/6 equations. But these are easily seen not to be all independent; at most (n -I)(n -2)/2 are independent and all the rest follow by algebraic manipulation.
A convenient way to get a set of independent conditions is to hold r= n, and work with Bk -Qk7/Qn. Equation (4)' then becomes (4)" Bkj -BiBkn = Bjk -BkB3n. n>kt j<n. But these are the Antonelli integrability conditions, already shown to be equivalent to the Slutsky symmetry conditions.' 4. It has been fairly easy to show that the above conditions are necessary if there is to be a family of integrable surfaces.
They are also sufficient to guarantee the existence of such surfaces; but this is not so easy to show. We may, of course, always accept the guarantee of the pure mathematician that there is a general existence theorem on partial 1 Jevons, Walras, and Marshall did not have to be concerned with the integrability problem primarily because they implicitly assumed it away, and because they assumed that the marginal utility of any good depends on its own quantity alone. In this case (4), (4)', (4)" are always satisfied. ni) and where the y's are arbitrary proportionality constants.
In the three-dimensional case, we are swinging a vertical door whose vertical axis of hinging goes through the original point. When the door is at any angle, there is on its surface a unique " indifference " contour through the original point. If now we let the door swing through all angles, these indifference contours will sweep out a two-dimensional surface.
Analytically, for given y's, we can eliminate all the x's but x, and xn, and end up with a differential equation for xi and xn. This equation always has one solution through the initial point which we may write as follows where it is understood that all partial derivatives are to be evaluated at the equilibrium point.
In the neighbourhood of the equilibrium point, the slope of the contour is determined by to say that any consumer who obeys (i), (2), and (3) is behaving in a " self-contradictory " fashion from the standpoint of consistent ordinal preference. This is completely in line with what we should expect from non-integrability. When a scientist assumes (i), (2), and (3) it is not implied that he is being " self-contradictory ". I hope and trust that Wold and I would be in agreement that reversibility as such has nothing essential to do with integrability.
